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conflict, we would like to remind our readers that all views, facts,
and statements presented below, do not represent the views of the LAA
neither its members nor board of directors. Facts are stated as they
are from different U.S Sources ranging from Archives, press and documented
interviews. The LAA is not responsible of any of these facts and apologizes
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Between the years 1975 and 1991, a most devastating armed conflict
took place in
Lebanon. This war was one of the most devastating wars in recent memory.
Some 150,000 persons died, as many were seriously injured. The physical
destruction alone was estimated by International Organizations at
$25 to $30 billion which constituted close to 13 times the national
income of the country at the end of the war.The war was largely the
result of tensions between religious groups, worsened by the influx
of Palestinians. Each group in Lebanon has its own soldiers.To many
Lebanese, the complex 1975 Civil War can be summarized in only a few
words. These words are place-names, such as Ad Damur or Karantina,
which evoke traumatic memories of massacres and atrocities and need
no further explanation. A narrative of the Civil War is therefore
more a translation of this vocabulary of suffering and pain than a
chronology of campaigns.
~Start of conflict~
The Cairo Agreement and the Prelude to the 1975 Civil War
...The Lebanese army's inactivity continued under Shihab's successor,
Charles Hilu , who became president in 1964. Hilu and his army commander
refused to commit Lebanese troops to the June 1967 War, enraging many
Lebanese Muslims. In the aftermath of that war, the army and its Deuxième
Bureau turned a blind eye to Palestinian guerrillas infiltrating Lebanon
from Syria and other Arab countires , an attitude that angered Christians.
But when the army did not interfere with commando raids and the Israelis
launched attacks into Lebanon in retaliation against the Palestinian
forces, the army and the Deuxiéme Bureau were charged with
collusion with Israel. In December 1968, the government was humiliated
when Israeli commandos landed at Beirut International Airport and
destroyed Middle East Airlines aircraft with impunity. In October
1969, the Lebanese Army took a more active role in fighting Palestinian
forces. Nevertheless, it was clear that the army could decisively
defeat the Palestinians only at the risk of splitting the nation.
Therefore, army commander General Emil Bustani signed the Cairo Agreement
in November 1969 with Palestinian representatives .
The Cairo Agreement remains officially secret, but it apparently granted
to the Palestinians the right to keep weapons in their camps and to
attack Israel across Lebanon's border. By sanctioning the armed Palestinian
presence, however, Lebanon surrendered full sovereignty over military
operations conducted within and across its borders and became a party
to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
A turning point in Lebanon's modern history occurred in 1970. In that
year, Sulayman Franjiyeh was elected president. Franjiyeh, came from
the Christian enclave of Zgharta in northern Lebanon was accused of
not confronting Lebanon's growing security problems. Believing that
the Deuxième Bureau was staffed with Shihab loyalists, Franjiyah
purged it and stripped it of its powers. But the Deuxième Bureau
had been the only governmental entity capable of monitoring and controlling
the Palestinians, and Franjiyah's action unintentionally gave the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) more freedom of action in
Lebanon. The PLO leadership and guerrillas moved their main base of
operations from Jordan to Lebanon, where the Cairo Agreement endorsed
their presence. The influx of several hundred thousand Palestinians
upset Lebanon's delicate confessional balance , and polarized the
nation into two camps--those who supported and those who opposed the
PLO presence. Public order deteriorated with daily acts of violence
between Christians and Palestinians. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force
launched raids against the Palestinian refugee camps in retaliation
for PLO attacks in Western Europe. On April 10, 1973, Israeli commandos
infiltrated Beirut in a daring raid and attacked Palestinian command
centers in the heart of the capital Beirut .Once again, the conspicuous
absence of the Lebanese Army during the Israeli attack angered Lebanese
Muslims. Prime Minister Saib Salam claimed that Army commander General
Iskandar Ghanim--a Maronite--had disobeyed orders by not resisting
the Israeli raid, and he threatened to resign unless Ghanim were stripped
of his rank. Because Ghanim was allowed to remain as army commander
(until he was replaced by Hanna Said in September 1975), Salam did
resign.
When the Lebanese Army finally went into action, it was against the
PLO. In May 1973, fierce combat raged around the refugee camps for
two weeks. When the dust settled, it became clear to all Lebanese
that their army was not strong enough to control the PLO. To end the
fighting, the government negotiated the Melkart Agreement, which on
the one hand obligated the PLO to respect the "independence,
stability, and sovereignty" of Lebanon but on the other hard
ceded to the PLO virtual autonomy, including the right to maintain
its own militia forces in certain areas of Lebanon. These provisions
of the Melkart Agreement differed greatly from the Cairo Agreement,
which preserved the "exercise of full powers in all regions and
in all circumstances by Lebanese civilian and military authorities."
Lebanese Muslims believed that under the Melkart Agreement Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon had been accorded a greater degree of self-determination
than some Lebanese citizens. Inspired by this, they organized themselves
politically and militarily and tried to wrest similar concessions
from the central government. In 1974 Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt established
the Lebanese National Movement (formerly the Front for Progressive
Parties and National Forces), an umbrella group comprising antigovernment
forces.
The Military Cabinet
During the first months of intermittent combat between Muslims and
Christians, President Franjiyeh refused to commit the army to separate
the combatants. On May 23, however, he took the unorthodox and unprecedented
step of appointing a military cabinet. Muslim Brigadier Nur ad Din
Rifai, retired commander of the Internal Security Force, was named
prime minister. Rifai selected the controversial Ghanim as his minister
of defense; all other cabinet ministers except one were also military
officers. Franjiyeh's motives were difficult to discern. Perhaps Franjiyeh
sincerely thought that a strong interconfessional military government
with unquestionable authority over the army could avert wide spread
conflict, although Lebanon's democracy would be sacrificed. Indeed,
Syrian foreign minister Abdul Halim Khaddam reportedly warned Lebanese
politicians that the Lebanese Army was capable of uniting its ranks,
staging a coup d'état, and imposing a military dictatorship.
Nevertheless, Lebanon's first and last military government was short
lived, resigning two days after its inception. Even when installed
in the government, the army proved unwilling or incapable of exerting
authority in Lebanon. The resignation of the military government demonstrated
the power vacuum in Lebanese politics and served as the catalyst to
conflict. The rival military factions intensified their fighting,
and full-fledged civil war began in earnest.
First Combats
The Lebanese Civil War started on April 13, 1975, when unidentified
gunmen opened fire at a congregation outside a Maronite church in
Ayn ar Rummanaha, Christian suburb of Beirut . In apparent retaliation,
members of the Christian Phalange Party ambushed a bus filled with
Palestinians and shot the passengers. These events initiated the escalating
cycle of retaliation and revenge that came to characterize Lebanon
for the next decade.
The first six months of combat were desultory by subsequent Lebanese
standards, with Phalangist and Palestinian forces exchanging small-arms
and rocket-propelled grenade fire from their respective strongholds
of Al Ashrafiyah and Tall Zatar. The Phalangist strategy was predicated
(hoping) on forcing the army to intervene on its side. Although over
1,000 people were killed in the early fighting, many Lebanese still
viewed the nascent Civil War as a transitory phenomenon that would
soon abate, like past security crises. Therefore, when well-organized
Muslim militias attacked the downtown Qantari district in late October
1975, causing heavy loss of life and massive property damage, many
inhabitants of Beirut realized for the first time that the war was
a serious affair. The Muslim side eventually took Qantari and occupied
the forty-story Murr Tower, the highest building in Beirut.
On December 6, 1975, "Black Saturday," Phalangists set up
roadblocks on city streets, seized an estimated 350 Muslims, and murdered
them. Muslims had been easily identifiable because Lebanese identification
cards indicated religious affiliation. This was the first major massacre
of civilians in the Civil War and started a vicious cycle of revenge
and retaliation. From this point on, after combatants of each faction
conquered territory from their rivals, they routinely killed civilians.
In late 1975 and early 1976, fierce fighting engulfed Beirut's high-rise
hotel district. The hotels changed hands several times, with the Muslims
ultimately securing control of the area. The expanded scope and intensity
of the combat increased casualties greatly, with over 1,000 killed
in the first weeks of the new year.
It was at this juncture that the Lebanese Army disintegrated completely.
On January 16, 1976, Minister of Defense Shamun called in the mostly
Christian-manned Lebanese Air Force to bomb leftist positions in Ad
Damur. In response, Muslim troops rallied to the side of Lieutenant
Ahmad Khatib, who split off and declared the creation of the Lebanese
Arab Army . In desperation, Beirut garrison commander Brigadier Aziz
Ahdab seized Beirut's radio and television stations on March 11 and
announced that the Lebanese Army was stepping in to take over the
government and restore order. But Ahdab's move came too late, and
he was derisively nicknamed "General Television" by militia
leaders, who commanded far more men. Karantina, a slum district named
after the old immigration quarantine area, was the site of the next
major episode in the war. Situated so that it controlled Christian
access over the Beirut "River bridge" to the strategic port
area, it became a military target. Karantina was populated primarily
by poor Kurds and Armenians but was controlled by a PLO detachment.
On January 18, 1976, Christian forces conquered Karantina and up to
1,000 civilians were killed. Two days later, revenge-seeking Palestinians
and leftist Muslims attacked the Christian city of Ad Damur, located
about 20 kilometers south of Beirut, and murdered between 200 and
500 Christians. The two consecutive massacres induced Muslims residing
in Christian-dominated areas to flee to Muslim-held areas, and vice
versa. Whereas most Lebanese towns and neighborhoods previously had
been integrated, for the first time large-scale population transfers
began to divide the country into segregated zones, the first step
toward de facto partition.
The Christians were losing the Civil War as the Muslim-leftist side
forced them to retreat farther into East Beirut. The Christians felt
it imperative to retain control of Beirut's port district and constructed
an elaborate barricade defense at Allenby Street. In May 1976, as
the Christians tried to stave off the Muslim assault on the port district,
the Lebanese Army finally
entered the fray. Christian officers and enlisted men from the Al
Fayadiyyah barracks outside Beirut came to the aid of their beleaguered
coreligionists, bringing armored cars and heavy artillery. The Muslim
advance was stopped, and the front at Allenby Street evolved into
a no-man's-land, dividing Christian East Beirut from Muslim West Beirut.
Vegetation that
eventually grew in this abandoned area inspired the name "Green
Line" , and the Green Line remained till the End Of The War .
Regional Intervention
The government of Syria, although in theory a socialist regime, feared
that a leftist victory and the installation of a radical government
in Lebanon would undermine Syrian security and provide Israel an excuse
to intervene in the area. After repeated diplomatic efforts failed
to quell the Lebanese Civil War, on June 1, 1976, Syria intervened
on the side of the Christians. In the following months, the Syrian
presence grew to 27,000 troops. By November the Syrians had occupied
most Muslim-held areas of Lebanon, including West Beirut and Tripoli.
Most Muslim forces capitulated without firing a shot, overwhelmed
by the Syrian show of force. In Sidon, however, Palestinian and leftist
forces fought off the Syrians for nearly six months before relinquishing
their stronghold.
For nearly the entire first year of the Civil War, the Phalangists
and the PLO had made a mutual attempt to avoid combat, even as smaller
Christian and Palestinian splinter groups clashed. The PLO tried to
enhance its reputation and credibility by playing the role of a neutral
mediator between the Lebanese left and the Christians. For its part,
the Phalange Party avoided antagonizing the PLO because it feared
that the Palestinians would intervene on the Muslim side. After Syria
had subdued the Muslim threat, however, the Phalangists turned their
full attention to the Palestinians.
The battle for Tall Zatar was the final showdown of the Lebanese Civil
War. Tall Zatar was a Palestinian refugee camp situated on the Christian
side of the Green Line where about 1,500 Palestinian guerrillas defended
a civilian population of roughly 20,000 against several thousand Christian
militiamen. The Christians were supported and advised in their siege
by the
Lebanese and Syrian armies; Israeli advisers were also present on
the Christian side.
Because Tall Zatar was honeycombed with bunkers and tunnels, the PLO
was able to defend the camp from persistent Christian attacks for
about six months, despite a nearly constant barrage of artillery fire
that took a large toll. On August 12 Christian forces finally overran
the camp and many of the several thousand civilians who had remained
there were killed.
The Arab deterrent Forces (a.k.a Riyadh conference)
In October 1976 a League of Arab States (Arab League) summit conference
was convened in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, to resolve the Lebanese crisis.
The conference did not address the underlying political and demographic
problems, only the security situation. The resulting multilateral
agreement mandated a cease-fire and, at the Lebanese government's
behest,
authorized the creation of the Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) to impose
and supervise the cease-fire. In theory the ADF, funded by the Arab
League, was to be a pan-Arab peacekeeping force under the supreme
command of the Lebanese president. In reality, only about 5,000 Arab
troops from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf states, Libya, and Sudan
augmented the existing
Syrian forces. Moreover, Syria would not relinquish actual command
over its soldiers. Therefore, the agreement in effect legitimized
and subsidized the Syrian occupation of Lebanon. In the summer of
1977. Syria, the PLO, and the government of Lebanon signed the Shtawrah
Accord, which detailed the planned disposition of the ADF in Lebanon
and called for a reconstituted Lebanese Army to take over PLO positions
in southern Lebanon.
The Red Line
Meanwhile, Israel grew concerned over the Syrian military presence
in Lebanon, particularly as the Syrian Army pursued retreating Palestinians
and Muslim leftists into southern Lebanon. Israel believed that the
Syrian forces, massed in southern Lebanon, might attack Israel across
the unfortified Lebanese border and thus avoid the need to penetrate
the heavily defended
Golan Heights. Therefore, Israel enunciated its "Red Line"
policy, threatening to attack Syria if it crossed a line identified
geographically with the Litani River . Thus, Syrian forces were generally
precluded from moving south of the Litani. The Red Line was a geographic
line, but it was also more subjective than a line on a map. Israeli
prime minister Yitzhak Rabin identified the Red Line as a guideline
for gauging Syria's overall military behavior in Lebanon, and he described
several criteria Israel would use: the objectives of Syrian forces
and against whom they were operating, the geographical area and its
proximity to Israel's borders, the strength and composition of Syrian
forces, and the duration of their stay in a given area.
Operation Litani
Because it was skeptical about the willingness and capability of
the Lebanese Army to implement the Shtawrah Accord by displacing the
PLO in southern Lebanon and securing the border area, in 1977 Israel
started to equip and fund a renegade Christian remnant of the Lebanese
Army led by Major Saad Haddad. Haddad's force, which became known
as The Free
Lebanon Army, and later as the South Lebanon Army (SLA), grew to a
strength of about 3,000 men and was allied closely with Israel. Haddad
eventually proclaimed the enclave he controlled "Free Lebanon."
The insulation provided by this buffer area permitted Israel to open
up its border with Lebanon. Under this so-called "Good Fence"
policy, Israel provided aid and
conducted trade with Lebanese living near the border.
On March 11, 1978, PLO made a sea landing in Haifa, Israel, commandeered
a bus, and then drove toward Tel Aviv, firing from the windows. By
the end of the day, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had killed the
nine attackers, who had murdered thirty-seven Israeli civilians. In
retaliation, four days later Israel launched Operation Litani, invading
Lebanon with a force of 25,000 men. The purpose of the operation was
to push PLO positions away from the border and bolster the power of
the SLA. The IDF first seized a security belt about ten kilometers
deep, but then pushed north and captured all of Lebanon south of the
Litani River, inflicting thousands of casualties.
Bashir Jemayel Era
Emboldened by Israel's willingness to intervene militarily in Lebanon,
Bashir Jumayyil exploited Israel's tacit guarantees to consolidate
his position within the fractious Maronite community. On June 13,
1978, he launched a surprise attack that decimated the Marada Brigade,
the pro-Syrian Christian Militia led by Tony Franjiyah (son of the
former president), who was killed in the attach, and provoked the
Syrians with direct attacks. In pitting his meager force of a few
thousand fighters against three divisions of the Syrian Army, Jumayyil
was taking a calculated gamble that Israel would come to his rescue
and evict the Syrians. Syria rushed forces to Beirut and unleashed
a devastating artillery attack on East Beirut, particularly the Phalangist
stronghold of Al Ashrafiyah, in preparation for taking over the area.
But Jumayyil's brinkmanship was vindicated. The IDF massed forces
on the Golan Heights and threatened to go to war to preserve the Maronite
community. To emphasize the point,
Israeli jets overflew Syrian positions. The threat worked, and Syria
withdrew its troops.
Once again, Jumayyil took the opportunity to strengthen his grip over
the Maronites. On July 7, 1980, the Phalangists launched another surprise
attack, wiping out Shamun's Militia, the Tigers. Through this process
of elimination, Jumayyil emerged as the dominant Maronite military
leader.
Jumayyil persevered in his plot to embroil Israel in a fullscale war
with Syria. In late 1980.
In April 1981, Jumayyil decided to put Israel's promise to the test.
Syria had launched its "Program of National Reconciliation,"
which was designed to install Sulayman Franjiyah as president. Jumayyil
found the proposition unpalatable, but he was impotent to oppose it
politically. Therefore, he staged an incident in the city of Zahlah
deliberately calculated to flare
into a major crisis. Zahlah, the capital of Al Biqa Province in eastern
Lebanon, had never been a Phalangist base; its population was primarily
proSyrian Greek Orthodox, and it was about fifteen kilometers west
of the Syrian border in the heart of the Syrian-occupied zone of Lebanon.
Jumayyil infiltrated approximately 100 Phalangist militiamen into
the city to attack Syrian positions and to shell the Syrian headquarters
in the adjacent town of Shtawrah. The Syrians responded by besieging
Zahlah. Jumayyil then called an urgent meeting with Begin and convinced
him that the Syrians intended to follow through on the siege with
an all-out attack on the Christian heartland. Although Syrian president
Hafiz al Assad had told Jumayyil he would lift the siege if the Phalangists
evacuated the city, Jumayyil concealed this point from Begin and instead
urged Israel to honor its promise and launch an air strike against
the Syrians.
On April 28, the Israeli cabinet convened and authorized a limited
air strike, but it did so over the strident objections of Israel's
intelligence chiefs, who suspected that the crisis was a Phalangist
ploy. Israeli fighters carried out the raid and downed two Syrian
helicopter troop transports on Jabal Sannin, a strategic mountain
overlooking Zahlah.
The Israeli attack caught the Syrians by surprise. Syria had adhered
to the so-called "Red Line" agreements by deliberately refraining
from deploying antiaircraft missiles in the Biqa Valley and by not
impeding Israeli photoreconnaissance overflights. Assad responded
to the Israeli attack by stationing SA-6 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
in the vicinity of Zahlah. Other SAMs
and surface-to-surface missiles were deployed on the Syrian side of
the border. Begin vowed publicly that the IDF would launch an attack
on the missiles. In response, President Ronald Reagan dispatched to
the Middle East Special Ambassador Philip Habib, who averted the imminent
Israeli strike. Meanwhile, the Phalangists abandoned Zahlah, and Syria
reasserted its control over the Biqa Valley. The net effect of the
crisis was that Syrian air defense missiles were deployed in Lebanon.
Israel was forced to tolerate this situation in the short run, but
it still regarded the missile deployment as an unacceptable shift
in the balance of forces that could not be endured indefinitely. Therefore,
Israel had reasons of its own for a future attack on the Syrians in
Lebanon.
As the tension in the Biqa Valley subsided, IDF chief of staff Rafael
Eitan urged Begin to mount an artillery bombardment of Palestinian
bases in Lebanon. Israel routinely conducted preemptive artillery
attacks and air strikes to deter PLO terrorist attacks against Galilee
settlements in northern Israel. Then, on July 10, 1981, the IDF commenced
five days of air strikes and naval bombardments against PLO strongholds
in southern Lebanon.
The PLO fought back by shelling the Israeli resort town of Nahariyya
on the Mediterranean coast. The conflict escalated as Israel launched
a devastating air raid against the heavily populated Palestinian neighborhood
of Fakhani in West Beirut, killing over 100 people and wounding over
600. By Israeli estimates, only thirty of those killed were terrorists.
For ten days, the PLO then unleashed artillery fire against the upper
Galilee. Although only six Israeli citizens were killed, many Israelis
were shocked and stunned by the PLO's capability to sustain such an
attack.
On July 24, Ambassador Habib returned to Israel to negotiate an end
to the artillery duel. Because the PLO was almost out of ammunition
and most of its guns had been silenced, the IDF wanted to prolong
the fighting until it could win a clear-cut victory. But the Israeli
cabinet was eager to comply with Habib's cease-fire proposal, and
Israel entered into a truce with the PLO.
PLO leader Yasir Arafat was determined not to break the ceasefire
. On a political level, the truce enhanced the PLO's diplomatic credibility.
Tactically, it allowed the PLO time to reinforce its military strength
in southern Lebanon. The Soviet Union refused to provide the PLO with
weapons, but PLO emissaries purchased arms from East European countries
and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), acquiring Grad
and Katyusha artillery rockets and antiquated but functional T-34
tanks.
On June 4, IDF aircraft bombed Palestinian targets in West Beirut,
and the PLO resumed artillery fire on Israeli settlements in the northern
Galilee.
The Israeli cabinet convened and voted to authorize an invasion, named
Operation Peace for Galilee, but it set strict limits on the extent
of the incursion. The IDF was to advance no farther than forty kilometers,
the operation was to last only twenty-four hours, Syrian forces were
not to be attacked, and Beirut was not to be approached.
Beirut Under Seige
The cease-fire signaled the start of a new stage in the war, as Israel
focused on PLO forces trapped in Beirut. Although Israel had long
adhered to the axiom that conquering and occupying an Arab capital
would be a political and military disaster, key Israeli leaders were
determined to drive the PLO out of Beirut. According to the original
plan, the Phalangists were to move
into West Beirut under the covering fire of Israeli artillery and
reunite the divided capital. Bashir Jumayyil concluded, however, that
such overt collusion with the IDF would prejudice his chances to become
president, and he reneged on the promises he had made.
Israel maintained the siege of Beirut for seventy days, unleashing
a relentless barrage of air, naval, and artillery bombardment. At
times, the Israeli bombardment appeared to be random and indiscriminate;
at other times, it was targeted with pinpoint precision. Then, the
Israeli Air Force conducted what has been called a "manhunt by
air" for Arafat and his top lieutenants and on several occasions
bombed premises only minutes after the PLO leadership had vacated
them.
If the PLO was hurt physically by the bombardment, the political fallout
was just as damaging to Israel. The appalling civilian casualties
earned Israel world opprobrium. Morale plummeted among IDF officers
and enlisted men, many of whom personally opposed the war. Meanwhile,
the highly publicized plight of the Palestinian civilians garnered
world attention for the
Palestinian cause. Furthermore, Arafat was negotiating, albeit through
intermediaries, with Ambassador Habib and other United States officials.
Negotiating with Arafat was thought by some to be tantamount to United
States recognition of the PLO.
Arafat had threatened to turn Beirut into a "second Stalingrad,"
to fight the IDF to the last man. His negotiating stance grew tenuous,
however, after Lebanese leaders, who had previously expressed solidarity
with the PLO, petitioned him to abandon Beirut to spare the civilian
population further suffering. Arafat informed Habib of his agreement
in principle to withdraw the PLO from Beirut on condition that a multinational
peacekeeping force be deployed to protect the Palestinian families
left behind. With the diplomatic deadlock broken, Habib made a second
breakthrough when Syria and Tunisia agreed to host departing PLO fighters.
An advance unit of the Multinational Force (MNF), 350 French troops,
arrived in Beirut on August
21. The Palestinian evacuation by sea to Cyprus and by land to Damascus
commenced on the same day. On August 26, the remaining MNF troops
arrived in Beirut, including a contingent of 800 United States Marines.
The Palestinian exodus ended on September 1. Approximately 8,000 Palestinian
guerrillas, 2,600 PLA regulars, and 3,600 Syrian troops had been
evacuated from West Beirut.
Lebanese estimates, compiled from International Red Cross sources
and police and hospital
surveys, calculated that 17,825 Lebanese had died and over 30,000
had been wounded.
On August 23, the legislature elected Bashir Jumayyil president of
Lebanon. On September 10, the United States Marines withdrew from
Beirut, followed by the other members of the MNF. The Lebanese Army
began to move into West Beirut, and the Israelis withdrew their troops
from the front lines. But the war was far from over. By ushering in
Jumayyil as president and
evicting the PLO from Beirut, Israel had attained two of its key war
goals. Israel's remaining ambition was to sign a comprehensive peace
treaty with Lebanon that would entail the withdrawal of Syrian forces
and prevent the PLO from reinfiltrating Lebanon after the IDF withdrew.
Jumayyil repudiated earlier promises to Israel immediately after the
election. He informed the Israelis that a peace treaty was inconceivable
as long as the IDF or any other foreign forces remained in Lebanon
and that it could be concluded only with the consent of all the Lebanese.
But on September 14, 1982, President-elect Jumayyil was assassinated
in a massive radio-detonated explosion that leveled the Phalange Party
headquarters where he was delivering a speech to party members. The
perpetrator, Habib Shartuni, was soon apprehended. Shartuni, a member
of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party, was allegedly a Syrian
agent. Jumayyil's brother, Amin, who was hostile to the Israeli presence
in Lebanon, was elected president with United States backing.
On the evening of September 16, 1982, the IDF, having surrounded the
Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, dispatched approximately
300 to 400 Christian militiamen into the camps to rout what was believed
to be the remnant of the Palestinian forces. The militiamen were mostly
Phalangists under the command of Elie Hubayka , a former close aide
of Bashir Jumayyil, but militiamen from the Israeli-supported SLA
were also present. The IDF ordered its soldiers to refrain from entering
the camps, but IDF officers supervised the operation from the roof
of a six-story building overlooking parts of the area. According to
the report of the Kahan Commission established by the government of
Israel to investigate the events, the IDF monitored the Phalangist
radio network and fired illumination flares from mortars and aircraft
to light the area. Over a period of two days, the Christian militiamen
killed some 700 to 800 Palestinian men, women, and children.
The Multinational Force
At the behest of the Lebanese government, the Multinational Force
(MNF) was deployed again in Beirut, but with over twice the manpower
of the first peacekeeping force. It was designated MNF II and given
the mandate to serve as an "interpositional force," separating
the IDF from the Lebanese population. Additionally, MNF II was assigned
the task of assisting the Lebanese Army in restoring the authority
of the central government over Beirut. The United States dispatched
a contingent of 1,400 men, France 1,500, and Italy 1,400. A relatively
small British contingent of about 100 men was added in January 1983,
at which time the Italian contingent was increased to 2,200 men. Each
contingent retained its own command structure, and no
central command structure was created. The French contingent was assigned
responsibility for the port area and West Beirut.
The Italian contingent occupied the area between West Beirut and Beirut
International Airport, which encompassed the Sabra and Shatila refugee
camps. The 32d United States Marines Amphibious Unit returned to Beirut
on September 29, where it took up positions in the vicinity of Beirut
International Airport. The Marines' positions were adjacent to the
IDF front lines.
The Marines' stated mission was to establish an environment that permit
would the Lebanese Army to carry out its responsibilities in the Beirut
area. Tactically, the Marines were charged with occupying and securing
positions along a line from the airport east to the Presidential Palace
at Babda. The intent was to separate the IDF from the population of
Beirut.
The key to the initial success of MNF II was its neutrality. The Lebanese
government had assured Ambassador Habib in writing that it had obtained
commitments from various factions to refrain from hostilities against
the Marines. The United States reputation among the Lebanese was enhanced
when a Marine officer was obliged to draw his pistol to halt an Israeli
advance, an event sensationalized in the news media. And, in the same
month, Marines conducted emergency relief operations in the mountains
after a midwinter blizzard.
At this juncture, the prevalent mood in Lebanon was one of cautious
optimism and hope. The Lebanese Army was pressed into service to clear
away the rubble of years of warfare. The government approved a US$600
million reconstruction plan. On October 1, President Jumayyil declared
Beirut reunited, as the army demolished barricades along the Green
Line that had been
standing since 1975. Hundreds of criminals and gang leaders were rounded
up and arrested. In the first months of 1983, approximately 5,000
government troops were deployed throughout Greater Beirut. Most important,
the government began to build a strong national army (see The Lebanese
Armed Forces in the 1980s, this ch).
Lebanese optimism was bolstered by changing Israeli politics and policies.
Minister of Defense Ariel Sharon, the architect of Israel's war in
Lebanon, had resigned in the wake of the Sabra and Shatila investigation,
although he remained in the cabinet as a minister without portfolio.
He was replaced by the former ambassador to the United States, Moshe
Arens. Although Arens was considered a hawk in the Israeli political
spectrum, he was not committed to Sharon's ambitious goals and wanted
the IDF to withdraw promptly from Lebanon, if only to avoid antagonizing
the United States, with which he had cultivated a close relation.
Accordingly, Israel withdrew its forces to the outskirts of the capital.
But the IDF had no clear tactical mission in Lebanon. Its continued
presence was intended as a bargaining chip in negotiations for a Syrian
withdrawal. While awaiting the political agreement, the IDF was forced
to fight a different kind of war, which Israeli newspapers compared
with the Vietnam War. The IDF had been turned into a static and defensive
garrison force likethe Syrians before them, caught in the cross fire
between warring factions. When Phalangist forces tried to exploit
the fluid situation by attacking the Druze militia in the Shuf Mountains
in late 1983, the IDF had to intervene and separate the forces. In
southern Lebanon, the IDF had to protect the many Palestinian refugees
who had streamed back to the camps against attacks by Israel's proxy
force, the SLA. In one of the bigger ironies of the war, the IDF recruited
and armed Palestinian home guards to prevent a repetition of the massacres
in Beirut.
May 17 Agreement:
In April 1983, a terrorist attack destroyed the United States embassy,
and the ambassador moved diplomatic operations to his official residence.
The United States persevered in its efforts to broker an Israeli-Lebanese
agreement, and Israel announced its willingness to negotiate. Although
Israel had envisaged a treaty like the Camp David Agreements with
Egypt, entailing full bilateral diplomatic recognition, it settled
for mere "normalization." The military and security articles
of the May 17 Agreement between the Israeli and Lebanese governments
called for an abolition of the state of war between the two countries,
security arrangements to ensure the sanctity of Israel's northern
border, integration of Major Haddad's SLA into the regular Lebanese
Army, and Israeli withdrawal.
The Israeli withdrawal was made contingent upon concurrent Syrian
withdrawal, however. The United States had decided not to seek Syrian
participation in the negotiations for the May 17 Agreement for fear
of becoming entangled in the overall SyrianIsraeli imbroglio. Instead,
the United States intended to seek Syrian endorsement after the agreement
was signed. But
Syria vehemently opposed the agreement, and because implementation
hinged on Syrian withdrawal, Damascus could exert veto power. Although
President Jumayyil made conciliatory overtures to Damascus, he also
notified the Arab League on June 4 that the ADF was no longer in existence.
Syria responded by announcing on July 23, 1983, the foundation of
the National Salvation Front (NSF). This coalition comprised many
sects, including the Druzes led by Walid Jumblatt; Shias led by Nabih
Birri (also seen as Berri); Sunni Muslims led by Rashid Karami; Christian
elements led by Sulayman Franjiyah; and several smaller, Syrian-sponsored,
left-wing political parties. These groups, together with Syria, controlled
much more of Lebanon's territory than did the central government.
Therefore, the NSF constituted a challenge not only to Jumayyil but
also to his patrons, the United States and Israel. To emphasize their
opposition to the May 17 Agreement, Syrian and Druze forces in the
mountains above the capital loosed a barrage of artillery fire on
Christian areas of Beirut, underscoring the weakness of Jumayyil's
government.
By mid-1983 the mood of optimism that had flourished at the end of
1982 had disappeared. It became clear that the tentative alliance
of Lebanon's rival factions was merely a function of their shared
opposition to a common enemy, Israel. Terrorist activity resumed,
and between June and August 1983, at least twenty car bombs exploded
throughout Lebanon, killing over
seventy people. Lebanon's prime minister narrowly escaped death in
one explosion. Targets included a mosque in Tripoli; a television
station, hospital, and luxury hotel in Beirut; and a market in Baalbek.
The May 17 Agreement had significant implications for the MNF. As
a noncombatant interpositional force preventing the IDF from entering
Beirut, the MNF had been perceived by the Muslims in West Beirut as
a protector. As the Israeli withdrawal neared, however, the MNF came
to be regarded as a protagonist in the unfinished Civil War, propping
up the Jumayyil government. In August militiamen began to bombard
United States Marines positions near Beirut International Airport
with mortar and rocket fire as the Lebanese Army fought Druze and
Shia forces in the southern suburbs of Beirut. On August 29, 1983,
two Marines were killed and fourteen wounded, and in the ensuing months
the Marines came under almost daily attack from artillery, mortar,
rocket, and small-arms fire.
The Mountain War:
On September 3, 1983, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) began to evacuate
the Shuf Mountains region and within twenty-four hours had completed
its redeployment to south of the Awwali River. In the power vacuum
resulting from the Israeli withdrawal, the Phalangist militia, no
longer under Jumayyil's firm control, clashed with the Druze militia
at Bhamdun, a town
located where the Beirut-Damascus highway touches the edge of the
Shuf Mountains. Simultaneously, the Lebanese Army sought to guard
the cities of Suq al Gharb and Khaldah to prevent Druze forces from
invading Beirut.
After several days of combat, the Phalangist militia was routed at
Bhamdun and retreated to its stronghold of Dayr al Qamar, along with
much of the Christian population. The Druzes surrounded and besieged
Dayr al Qamar, which held 40,000 Christian residents and refugees
and 2,000 Phalangist fighters. In other areas of the Shuf Mountains,
the Druzes went on a
rampage reminiscent of the 1860 massacres (see Religious Conflicts,
ch. 1). The Catholic Information Center in Beirut reported that 1,500
Christian civilians were killed and 62 Christian villages demolished.
The defeat of the Phalangists was expensive for the Christian community,
which lost a large amount of territory.
The cost in political currency was even higher, however. Not only
did the fighting deal a blow to Amin Jumayyil's credibility and authority
in his dual role as chief of state and leader of the Christian community,
it destroyed the myth shared by many different Lebanese factions that
the Lebanese Civil War had been settled in 1976. Admittedly, Christians
and Muslims had
continued to fire on each other's neighborhoods on occasion, but this
was perceived as part of Lebanon's environment, like the weather.
In all the significant fighting between 1976 and 1982, the Syrians,
Israelis, and Palestinians had been belligerents on either or both
sides of the conflict. The Mountain War, as the 1983-84 fighting in
the Shuf Mountains came to be called,
however, was a purely Lebanese contest, and it dashed the hopes harbored
by many that the withdrawal of foreign forces would end the Civil
War.
In Suq al Gharb and Khaldah, it was the Lebanese Army rather than
the Phalangists that confronted the Druze militias. On September 16,
1983, Druze forces massed on the threshold of Suq al Gharb. For the
next three days the army's Eighth Brigade fought desperately to retain
control of the town (see The Army, this ch.). The tiny Lebanese Air
Force was thrown
into the fray, losing several aircraft to Druze missile fire. United
States Navy warships shelled Druze positions and helped the Lebanese
Army hold the town until a cease-fire was declared on September 25,
on which day the battleship U.S.S. New Jersey arrived on the scene.
The Multinational Forces Withdrawal:
Although the Lebanese Army had beaten the Druze forces on the battlefield,
it was a Pyrrhic victory because the army was discredited if not defeated.
Approximately 900 Druze enlisted men and 60 officers defected from
the army to join their coreligionists. The Lebanese Armed Forces chief
of staff, General Nadim al Hakim, fled into Druze territory, but he
would not
admit he had actually defected. Thus, the army again had split along
confessional lines. Furthermore, the army had halted the Druzes only
with United States armed intervention.
For its part, the United States had clearly inherited Israel's role
of shoring up the precarious Lebanese government. On September 29,
1983, the United States Congress, by a solid majority, adopted a resolution
declaring the 1973 War Powers Resolution to apply to the situation
in Lebanon and sanctioned the United States military presence for
an eighteen-month period.
Although the MNF remained in Lebanon after the October 1983 suicide
truck bombings, the situation of the United States and French contingents
was precarious (see Suicide Bombings, this ch.). In early February
1984, Shia Amal militiamen clashed with the Lebanese Army in the southern
suburbs of Beirut and after four days of heavy fighting gained control
over Beirut
International Airport, evicted the army from West Beirut, and reestablished
the Green Line partitioning the capital. The decisive defeat of the
army on two key fronts led to its gradual disintegration, as demoralized
soldiers defected to join the opposition. United States Marines stationed
near Beirut International Airport were surrounded by predominantly
Shia militia groups. As the security environment in Lebanon deteriorated,
Britain, France, Italy, and the United States decided to withdraw
their MNF contingents.
The Bickfaya Accord:
The withdrawal of the MNF left Syria as the dominant force in Lebanon,
and Syria acted rapidly to consolidate its grip on Lebanese affairs.
It pressured Jumayyil to abrogate the May 17 Agreement, and he did
so on March 6, 1985. This event led to the resignation of the Council
of Ministers and its replacement by a new government of national unity
headed by Rashid
Karami.
Syria hammered out yet another security accord, the Bikfayya Agreement
of June 18. Muslim and Druze cabinet ministers had insisted on the
creation of a military command council to replace the post of commander
in chief of the armed forces, a proposal that was opposed by Christian
cabinet ministers, who perceived it as a dilution of their control
over the military. A
compromise was reached providing for the continuation of the post
of commander in chief, to be held by a Maronite as before, but also
the establishment of a multiconfessional six-man military command
council to have authority over appointments at the brigade and division
levels (see Organization and Command Structure, this ch.). Major General
Ibrahim Tannus, the army commander, was replaced by Major General
Michel Awn (also seen as Aoun), who was somewhat more acceptable to
Muslims. Furthermore, a new intelligence agency, the National Security
Council, was established, with the stipulation that it be headed by
a Shia Muslim. A Shia general, Mustafa Nasir, was named as the first
director of the new agency. Nevertheless, the Maronite-commanded military
intelligence apparatus remained intact as a separate but parallel
institution. The agreement also called for a cease-fire, the withdrawal
of heavy artillery and militiamen from the streets of East Beirut
and West Beirut, the dismantling of barricades along the Green Line,
and the reopening of the airport and port. The agreement formally
took effect on June 23 and was implemented by July 6, 1985.
Optimistic predictions that the Bikfayya Agreement would end Lebanon's
chronic conflict were dashed as sporadic battles and terrorist attacks
resumed. The accord was criticized vehemently by elements among the
Maronites as Druze, Shia, and Sunni militia fought one another in
West Beirut. Armed Shias stormed and burned the Saudi Arabian embassy
on August 24. On the
same day, the Lebanese National Resistance Front, an umbrella organization
fighting Israel in southern Lebanon, fired two rocket-propelled grenades
at the British embassy. On September 20, in a replay of the April
1983 attack, a suicide vehicle bomber attacked the new United States
embassy building in East Beirut, killing eight and wounding dozens.
The mounting
tension in Lebanon was exacerbated by Israeli air raids against Palestinian
guerrilla camps of the Abu Musa faction. The Bikfayya Agreement suffered
another blow on August 23, when General al Hakim, the newly appointed
Druze chief of staff of the Lebanese Armed Forces, died in an accidental
helicopter crash. And, on August 30 Maronite patriarch and Phalange
Party founder Pierre Jumayyil died of a heart attack, setting the
stage for a power struggle in the Christian community.
Syria, determined to implement the security plans it had sponsored,
attempted to restore order. It curbed the activities of the Iranian
Pasdaran and Hizballah in Baalbek in the Biqa Valley, and it quelled
the fierce fighting in the northern port city of Tripoli between the
pro-Syrian Arab Democratic Party and the Sunni fundamentalist Tawhid
(Islamic Unification Movement).
Coming soon ---
East-Beirut Under Siege:
Inter-Christian War:
Taef Agreement:
The End of the War:
~End of Conflict~
Since the end of Lebanon's devastating civil war in October 1990,
the country has established a more fair political system, Lebanon
has held its first legislative election in 20 years,
|